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Introduction
26 June 2012 saw the launch of the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s 
flagship publication, the World Drug Report. 
While it is now the norm to coordinate the launch 
with the International Day against Drug Abuse 
and Illicit Trafficking and hold simultaneous 
events in various national capitals, this year’s 
primary launch arguably received a higher 
profile than in previous years.  This was due to 
its inclusion within the opening section of the 
General Assembly’s thematic debate, ‘Drugs 
and Crime as a Threat to Development’, in New 
York.  Here, in front of the convened national 
delegations, the President of the General 
Assembly, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, and the 
UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, provided 
introductory remarks before the Executive 
Director of UNODC, Yury Fedotov, gave a more 
detailed account of the Report’s contents.  
This year’s publication represents an impressive 
and wide-ranging set of data collated and 
analysed by UNODC and provides an overview of 
recent trends and the current situation in terms 
of production, trafficking, consumption and the 
consequences of illicit drug use for treatment, 
drug-related diseases and drug-related deaths. 
The World Drug Report 2012 is presented in a 
new slimmer and more accessible format – this 
year it is only 100 pages long, more than half 
the size of the 2011 publication – and is divided 
into two main chapters.  Based upon data 
returned by governments up to 31 December 
2011 (see Box 1), the first of these chapters 
looks at market trends.  In what is essentially 
a return to the inclusion of a thematic chapter, 
the second offers a long-term perspective on 
the characteristics and evolution of the ‘drug 
problem’ and the main factors that shaped it.  
Although the setting ensured that Mr Fedotov’s 
comments in New York were framed very much 
within terms of crime and development, his 
principal message was that the Report’s findings 
revealed stable but shifting global illicit drug 
markets.  The Report suggests in headline terms 
that, with the exception of increased levels of 
opium production in Afghanistan, there has 
been no significant change in the ‘global status 
quo’ regarding the ‘use, production and health 
consequences of illicit drugs’ (p.1).  As we 
shall see, this is a theme that chimes with the 
prioritisation of the market containment narrative 
within chapter two.  Yet, the detailed information 
within the Report also signals significant 
changes, emerging complexities, regional 
variations and on-going flux in not only patterns 
of production and trafficking, but also in the illicit 
use of controlled drugs.  For example, while 
cocaine production has declined in Colombia 
there appears to have been an increase in coca 
bush cultivation and coca production in both the 
Plurinational Republic of Bolivia and Peru.  We are 
told that opium production might have declined 
in Mexico, but that it has gone up in Myanmar 
and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic with, 
after plant disease within the country in 2010, 
a substantial resurgence in Afghanistan.  Data 
within the Report also demonstrate the apparent 
dynamism of drug trafficking organisations 
(DTOs) to deal with both naturally induced market 
disruptions and the efforts of law enforcement 
agencies. For example, the coastal states of 
West Africa have become increasingly affected 
by trafficking activities.  
Further, as noted in previous Reports, and IDPC 
responses to them, prevalence patterns at a 
number of levels continue to shift.  For instance, 
2in the United States cocaine use remains in 
decline but data show that users are switching 
to other drugs, including methamphetamine 
and prescription medicines (see Box 2).  
The use of new psychoactive substances (see 
Box 3) is also changing the shape and nature 
of consumer markets.  Meanwhile the apparent 
decline in the US cocaine market has to some 
extent been offset by increases within Europe, 
and perhaps ‘hidden populations’ in other parts 
of the world.  Indeed, despite comments at the 
launch about how the Report is helping us to 
understand a ‘complete picture regarding the 
international drug problem’,1 the uncertainly 
of the data once again remains a key theme 
running throughout the publication (see Box 1).
  
While this is the case, from its first pages the 
Report also adopts an overtly defensive position 
on the efficacy of the current international drug 
control system and the conventions upon which 
it is based.  Within his preface, Mr Fedotov 
makes explicit reference to the ‘need to move as 
one; if not’, he warns, ‘we risk going backwards, 
not forwards’ (p. iv).  The phrasing is reminiscent 
of his opening speech at the 55th Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs, at which he spoke of the 
importance of the ‘Convention Songbook’.  On 
that occasion he informed us that, ‘like any choir, 
we must sing in harmony.  We cannot be out of 
tune.  To ensure this, a commitment is required 
from us all to acknowledge the importance of 
the Convention songbook’.2  The Preface, and 
frequently the extended analysis contained 
in the Report proper, repeats that call.  Such 
interventions leave us in no doubt that UNODC 
perceives the drug control system as being 
under threat of unravelling.  In Mr Fedotov’s 
terms, any questioning, such as that emanating 
from Bolivia and more recently – and although 
from a different perspective – Uruguay, that 
could lead to reform of the treaties would be 
going backwards, while going forward entails 
the reaffirmation of an unwavering commitment 
to them.  The problem with this position, which 
is perhaps understandable for a man who leads 
the agency which is in many ways the public face 
of the drug control system, is that it is already 
apparent that we are not moving as one; that is, 
there are dissenting voices in the drug control 
debate, a discussion which is slowly but steadily 
becoming more open and diverse.  Some UN 
member states clearly feel that the drug control 
conventions are no longer able to accommodate 
the solutions to their national dilemmas- at least 
as currently interpreted.
With these issues in mind, here we provide an 
overview of the data and topics presented in the 
Report and where appropriate, within the broader 
context of the current state of the UN drug control 
framework, offer a critical analysis of both.  
Box 1. Data, the on-going challenge  
Like previous recent reports, a key and reoccurring theme within this year’s publication (in 
both the main text and the separate methodology section) is poor, outdated or non-existent 
data sets, particularly in relation to areas of increasing concern such as Africa and Asia. 
UNODC stress in the opening pages of the Report that ‘Considerable challenges…remain in 
the reporting of trend data on illicit drug use, production and trafficking’ (p.3).  It continues to 
point to the fact that the ‘Main challenges continue to be the availability and reporting of data 
on different aspects of illicit drug demand and supply in Member States.  The lack of data is 
particularly acute in Africa and parts of Asia, where data on the prevalence of illicit drug use 
and trends remain vague at best.  Other aspects such as process and purity of drugs, seizures 
and trafficking patterns and methodological difficulties in estimating in some regions and the 
illicit production of substances – particularly cannabis and ATS – make it difficult to analyse and 
3The extent and changing patterns of 
illicit drug use
The Report takes every opportunity to highlight 
that the extent of illicit drug use has remained 
stable in the 5 years up to and including 
2010.  Continuing with the UNODC’s now well 
established practice of preferring ranges over 
point figures, it is estimated that between 3.4 
per cent and 6.6 per cent of the global adult 
population (defined as persons aged 15-64) 
had illicitly used a controlled substance at least 
once in the previous year.  This equates to an 
estimated global figure in 2010 of between 
153 million and 300 million users.  Within this 
population, it is estimated that around 12 per 
cent, between 15.5 million and 38.6 million, are 
‘problem drug users’, including those ‘with drug 
dependence and drug-use disorders’; a group 
that ‘remain a particular concern’ (p. 7) (see 
Box 2). As in previous years, such an approach 
includes the unavoidable admission that the 
majority of people who use controlled drugs 
illicitly are in fact non-problematic.  
present a complete picture of the ever evolving illicit market’ (all emphasis added).  Faced with 
such a dilemma, UNODC is forced to adopt methods of extrapolation that may be misleading. 
For example, while a welcome attempt to move away from regional comparisons, estimating 
Indian ATS use via imputation from data from neighbouring states risks overlooking cultural 
differences and country specific circumstances.3  On this problem in general, UNODC perhaps 
rather optimistically concludes ‘Most of the challenges can be overcome by sustained efforts 
in priority regions and countries to support and improve the collection of quality data on these 
different aspects of illicit drug use.  It is only then that the ebb and flow of the world’s illicit drug 
market can be measured’ (p. 3).  
Yet, that a constant feature of IDPC’s response to the World Drug Report is a focus on the poor 
Annual Report Questionnaire (ARQ) response or completion rates suggests that more effort is 
still required within this crucial area.  This year, for example, UNODC sent out the ARQ to 192 
Member States as well as 15 territories.  In response it received 91 replies to its questionnaire 
on ‘The extent and patterns and trends in drug use’ (ARQ Part III) and 94 replies on Part IV, 
‘Extent and patterns and trends in drug crop cultivation, manufacturing and trafficking’.  This 
represents a drop from 2010 when UNODC distributed ARQs to 195 countries and 15 territories 
and received 107 replies on drug consumption and 106 replies on illicit supply.  In 2011, the 
best response was from Member States in Europe where over 80 per cent of the countries 
responded, in Asia more than half (60 per cent) responded and in the Americas more than 40 
per cent of countries filled in the ARQ.  In the case of Africa, nearly 20 per cent of Member 
States, and in the Oceania region, only 2 out of 14 countries responded.  As in previous years, 
the quality on Part IV is significantly better than for information on drug demand.  Analysis of 
responses on Part IV revealed that 86 per cent were ‘substantially’ completed compared to 61 
per cent of Part III.4  Although conscious of the manifold problems associated with data capture 
on certain drug groups in some, particularly developing, countries, it is only when ARQ returns 
improve that UNODC will be able to reduce the currently inherent levels of uncertainty within 
its annual publication. 
4Box 2. Non-medical use of prescription pharmaceuticals
Although global figures for the non-medical use of prescription drugs other than opioids and 
amphetamines are not available, the use of drugs including tranquilisers and sedatives (such 
as the benzodiazepine family, diazepam, flunitrazepam or temazepam, methaquolone and 
barbiturates) is reportedly a growing health problem, with prevalence rates higher than for 
numerous controlled substances in many countries (p. 3).  In the USA, for example, lifetime, 
annual and monthly prevalence of non-medical use of psychotherapeutics (mostly pain relievers) 
among those aged 12 years and over was reported as 20.4 per cent, 6.3 per cent and 2.7 per 
cent respectively for 2010.  This is higher than for any drug other than cannabis.  There is also a 
big rise in the use of pharmaceuticals for non-medical purposes in Australia.  Additionally, while 
drug use among men greatly exceeds that among women, the non-medical use of tranquilisers 
and sedatives among women is, where data are available, ‘a notable exception to the rule’ (p.3). 
For instance, a 2009 survey in Afghanistan by UNODC and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics 
found that more than 10 per cent of people who use drugs had used tranquilisers without 
medical prescription in their lives, that women who use drugs were twice as likely to have used 
them than men, and that most of the women were daily users.  Similar pictures are provided for 
countries in South and central America and Europe (p. 13).   
Also of note are the findings presented showing that in general, in the normal lifecycle of drug 
use, there is a sharp decline in lifetime, annual and last month prevalence of non-medical 
pharmaceutical drug use with increasing age.  Data on non-medical use of tranquilisers and 
sedatives in European countries suggest, however, that the rate of attrition of use is much lower 
especially among women (p. 14).  There is also evidence that these substances are being used 
increasingly in combination with traditional controlled substances, in poly-drug use ‘designed to 
either enhance or counterbalance their effects’ (p.3).
With this in mind, in global terms the two 
most widely used drugs remain cannabis and 
amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS).  The global 
annual prevalence of cannabis ranges from 2.6 
per cent to 5.0 per cent; between an estimated 
119 million and 224 million adult users.  The 
Report notes that, while there may be shifts  in 
use between cannabis resin and cannabis herb 
and that there is evidence of the increasing 
popularity of synthetic marijuana among young 
people in some regions, the general annual 
prevalence of cannabis use remains stable.  The 
highest prevalence for cannabis was reported in 
Oceania (principally Australia and New Zealand) 
with a range of 9.1 per cent to 14.6 per cent 
of the adult population.  This was followed by 
North America (10.8 per cent), West and Central 
Europe (7 per cent) and West and Central Africa 
(5.2 per cent to 13.5 per cent).  It is important 
to note that although the estimated prevalence 
of cannabis use in Asia (1.0 per cent to 3.4 per 
cent) remains lower than the global average, the 
size of the region’s population make the absolute 
numbers (26 million to 92 million) the highest 
worldwide.  Further, of great significance is the 
news that in 2010 experts in many countries in 
West and Central Africa, South Africa, South 
Asia and Central Asia noted perceived increases 
in cannabis use – while UNODC note that ‘data 
on illicit drug use in Africa is limited’ (p. 11) 
cannabis is reckoned to be the most commonly 
used drug in the region.  
As the second most widely used controlled drug 
globally, data for ATS, excluding ‘ecstasy’, reveal 
prevalence levels of 0.3 per cent to 1.2 per cent 
5of the adult population in 2010 (14.3 million 
to 52.5 million users).  Increasing reports of 
methamphetamine seizures in South West Asia, 
Central Asia and Transcaucasia, as well reports 
on illicit substance use in some other areas, are 
leading to speculation that use of this variant 
may be increasing in those sub-regions.  Again, 
mindful of the limitations of data for the region, 
the use of ATS is also seen to be increasing 
within Africa.
The figures for ATS do not include ‘ecstasy’ 
group substances (mainly methylenedioxym-
ethamphetamine (MDMA) and its analogues), 
which are estimated to be used by 0.2 per cent 
to 0.6 per cent of the global population aged 
15-64 (10.5 million to 28 million users) – levels 
that are comparable to the prevalence of co-
caine use.  It should be noted that higher rates, 
especially among young people, were reported 
in Oceania, North America, and West and Cen-
tral Europe (p. 12).  Indeed, while ‘ecstasy’ use 
had previously been declining, we are told that 
it ‘appears that it started to increase in 2010’ 
(p. 10). While overall trends in Europe have re-
mained stable, ‘reports indicate an increase in 
the purity of ‘ecstasy’ available in Europe and a 
possible resurgence in its use’ especially among 
what are termed ‘club goers’ (p. 12).   In the 
USA, there are also reports of a ‘resurgence’ 
of ‘ecstasy’ use, particularly among high school 
children (p. 12).  There is, however, a declining 
trend in Australia.    
The available data in the Report demonstrate 
that the global annual prevalence of both cocaine 
and opiate use has remained stable overall, with 
ranges from 0.3 per cent to 0.4 per cent, and 
0.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent respectively, for the 
adult population.  
Box 3. The challenge of new psychoactive substances
As in recent years, the World Drug Report 2012, highlights at various points that new chemically 
engineered psychotropic substances designed to remain outside international control are 
increasingly being used and identified.  In numerous countries, particularly within Europe, North 
America and Oceania (principally countries with good data capture systems), reported use of 
these substances was an emerging and increasingly problematic trend in 2010.  In Europe, for 
example, UNODC stresses that while there may have been a stabilisation or decline in traditional 
drug use, the ‘rapid emergence of new synthetic drugs and increasing interplay between legal 
‘highs’ and the illicit market pose a major challenge in the region’ (p. 22). 
Most notable among these substances were methcathinone analogue 4-methyl-methcathinone 
(mephedrone), and methylenedioxypyrovalerone (MDPV), often labelled as bath salts or plant 
food and used as substitutes for stimulants such as cocaine or ‘ecstasy’. The Report also shows 
that several synthetic cannabinoids that emulate the effect of cannabis but contain uncontrolled 
products have been detected since 2008 in herbal smoking blends.
Other uncontrolled synthetic substances also being used to substitute or mimic the effects of 
controlled drugs have been reported. These include indanes, benzodifuranyls, narcotic analgesics 
(such as codeine converted into desomorphine in the Russian Federation), synthetic cocaine 
derivatives, Salvia divinorum (dried leaves of a plant native to Mexico with hallucinogenic effects 
reported in Canada), ketamine (commonly reported in South East Asia) and phencyclidine 
derivatives (p. 14). 
6‘Kratom’, a product derived from Mitragyna speciosa Korth, a tree found in South East Asia, 
has long been used to treat opioid withdrawal within the region (p. 15).  It has dose-dependent 
effects, with a stimulation effect at low doses and opioid effects at high.  Reflecting the 
increasingly global nature of both the illicit market and that for new synthetic substances, while 
kratom use is most prevalent in Malaysia, Myanmar and Southern Thailand, the EMCDDA show 
that it is also widely offered on the internet. 
Similarly, as with the traditional illicit market, DTOs continue to adapt their manufacturing 
strategies in order to avoid detection, ‘and such changes in the illicit manufacturing process 
of synthetic substances present new challenges to drug control authorities worldwide’ (p. 3).
With the estimated annual prevalence in 
2010 ranging from 0.6 per cent to 0.8 per 
cent of the population aged 15-64, the use of 
opioids5 (mainly heroin, morphine and non-
medical use of prescription opioids) is stable 
in the main markets, although North America, 
Oceania and East and South East Europe 
have higher than the average prevalence of 
opioid users.  Of the estimated 24.6 million 
to 36 million people who use opioid, it is 
reckoned that 13 million to 21 million use 
opiates, especially heroin.  The latest data 
suggest that heroin use is declining or stable 
in Europe.  However, countering such a 
picture of stability in Europe and in other main 
markets, we are told that ‘Experts in Asian and 
African countries perceive that heroin use has 
increased in their regions’ (p.7).  Furthermore, 
and once again reflecting the dynamic nature 
of the illicit market, the Report reveals that the 
use of synthetic opioids appears to be on the 
increase in some European countries.  There 
is evidence, for example, that in Estonia and 
Finland fentanyl and buprenorphine have 
displaced the use of heroin (p. 9).  In some 
parts of the Russian Federation, a recent 
heroin shortage (see below) has led many 
users to use desomorphine (also known as 
‘krokodil’), acetylated opium or fentanyl as 
substitutes. 
Similarly, while global cocaine use overall 
appears to remain stable at 13.2 million to 
19.5 million users, changes are taking place 
in the patterns of use.  There has, for example, 
been a substantial decrease in prevalence 
in North America and some countries in 
South America.  The USA in particular has 
experienced a decrease in prevalence from 
3.0 per cent in 2006 to 2.2 per cent of the 
adult population in 2010.  According to the 
Report, this ‘can be linked to a decline of 47 
per cent in cocaine manufacture in Colombia’ 
with the ‘turf wars’ between DTOs and law 
enforcement agencies in Mexico perhaps also 
being a factor (p. 37).  As IDPC has noted in 
the past, explaining market shifts is a complex 
issue and accurate attribution is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish. 
Consequently, while these factors may indeed 
have impacted upon prevalence figures, other 
variables, such as market maturation, must 
not be overlooked.  The Report indicates that 
Europe has not experienced a decline in supply 
on same magnitude as the USA, although 
prevalence has started to stabilise in some 
countries and decline in others.  Despite such 
changes in patterns of cocaine use, the highest 
prevalence remained in North America, West 
and Central Europe and Oceania.  There are 
also indications of increases in cocaine use 
in Oceania, Asia, Africa and some countries 
in South America, notably Brazil.  ‘Anecdotal’ 
information on increasing trafficking through 
African coastal countries in combination 
with the limited available data on use, points 
towards increases in this region. 
7Box 4. Drug use and health consequences
While UNODC highlights the stability of prevalence levels, it also gives some, but arguably 
insufficient, prominence to the continuing negative health consequences of drug use.  While 
this also relates to the non-medical use of prescription drugs (See Box 2) this is particularly so 
in relation to the 10-13 per cent of the drug using population defined as problem drug users, 
especially those who inject.  According to the soon to be disbanded Reference Group to the 
United Nations on HIV and Injecting Drug Use, a move that does not bode well for the collection 
and analysis of data in this area,    figures from 2007 reveal that of the estimated 16 million 
injecting drug users, about 3 million are living with HIV.  With the exception of sub-Saharan 
Africa, injecting drug use accounted for approximately one third of all new HIV infected globally 
in 2010.  The prevalence of hepatitis C and B were estimated at 46.7 per cent and 14.6 per cent 
respectively; a situation that continues to add to the global of disease.  
IDPC has noted in previous briefs,6 and the Report acknowledges this year, that there remain 
complications with the calculation of drug related deaths.  However, we are told that that 
‘approximately 1 in every 100 deaths among adults is attributed to drug use’ (p.1).  More 
specifically, UNODC estimates that illicit drug use resulted in between 99,000 and 253,000 
deaths globally, with drug-related deaths accounting for between 0.5 per cent and 1.3 per 
cent of all-cause mortality among those aged 15-64 (p. 7) – figures that are in line with those 
produced by WHO.  Demonstrating another example of UNODC good practice, the differences 
in figures from last year, and wide ranges presented for a region like Asia, reflect caution about 
uncertainty where no mortality data are available (p.17).  It is also noteworthy that ‘The number 
of deaths attributed to the non-medical use of prescription painkillers in the United States 
has risen steadily to a level that now exceeds the combined number due to heroin use (5,110 
deaths) and cocaine use (3,000 deaths) (p. 19).  
Meanwhile, patterns of drug related deaths also appear to be changing in countries to the 
south.  Although drug related deaths in South America are below the global average, we are 
told ‘Throughout the region cocaine continues to be ranked the most lethal drug’.  Significantly, 
however, the Report goes on to say that ‘it appears that in some countries in Central American 
and the Caribbean, the higher homicide rates are, in part, linked to organized crime and conflicts 
related to cocaine trafficking flows and cocaine markets’ (p. 20). Surprisingly, despite some 
discussion in the publication of law enforcement activities in Mexico, this is the only reference 
to the extreme levels of related violence within that nation.
Trends in illicit drug production and 
trafficking 
In headline terms, UNODC estimates that the 
production of opium increased from 4,700 tons 
in 2010 to 7,000 tons in 2011.  Afghanistan’s 
potential opium production resurged to 5,800 
tons in 2011, following a brief fall to just 3,600 
tons in 2010 due to widespread disease of the 
opium poppy within the country.  Significant 
increases were also reported in the other main 
producing states of Myanmar and the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic.  Preliminary 
estimates for Mexico suggest that production has 
decreased, although at the time of publication 
2011 data for the Americas (Mexico, Colombia 
and Guatemala) were not available (p. 26). 
8In terms of breaking down the processing of 
the 7,000 tons, it is estimated that 3,400 were 
consumed or trafficked as raw opium, with the 
remainder converted to heroin.  This results in an 
estimated figure of 467 tons of potential heroin 
manufacture in 2011, up from an estimated 
384 tons in 2010.  UNODC also estimate 
that, compared with previous years, a lower 
percentage of Afghan opium was processed into 
heroin in 2011.  While suggesting an interesting 
trend, its veracity is left in some doubt due to 
a lack of clarity concerning the methodology 
behind these data.  
While we need to be aware of such limitations, 
we are informed that the total global area under 
poppy cultivation increased between 2010 
and 2011; from 191,000 hectares to 207,000 
hectares. Once again, we are informed that 
‘Afghanistan remains the main country cultivating 
opium poppy, accounting for approximately 
63 per cent of global opium cultivation’ (p. 
27) with poppy production returning to 2009 
levels.  The Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
and Myanmar were responsible for 20 per cent 
of the global total, with countries in Central and 
South America making up almost 7 per cent of 
the area under poppy cultivation.  Significantly, 
again if the data is accurate,  the Report also 
notes the existence of ‘smaller areas under illicit 
opium poppy cultivation in many other countries 
and regions,’ including India and Guatemala (p. 
27).  Although the Report notes that UNODC 
draws on additional sources of data7, it would 
be interesting to discover how it reached 
this conclusion with regard to these specific 
countries, since it does not receive survey data 
from either of them. 
As noted above, the Report shows that, despite 
the shortfall in opium production in 2010, the 
consumption of opiates remained stable, and 
even declined in some places (such as the 
USA) as users shifted to synthetic substitutes. 
Indeed, average wholesale and retail markets 
in the most regularly monitored markets for 
opiates (Western and Central Europe and the 
Americas) have shown little change since 
2009.  This, however, does not seem reflect 
the situation seen in major opium producing 
countries like Afghanistan and Myanmar, where 
despite an increase in opium production, farm-
gate prices continued to rise.  The Report notes 
that ‘The latter implies that, despite the recent 
recovery of opium production, the demand 
for opium is continuing to increase’ (emphasis 
added).  To this we might also add that, although 
not specifically mentioned in this year’s Report, 
UNODC’s previous assessment of an inventory, 
or stockpile, of opium in Afghanistan is off the 
mark.8  While ignoring this point, the authors 
of the Report then pose the following set of 
questions:
• What exactly are the reasons for this 
apparent increase?
• Is the 2010 crop failure in Afghanistan 
leading to some kind of shift in the markets 
at source?
• And if so, how will this impact on the major 
illicit market for opiates further down the 
line? (p. 26).
UNODC admits that it is difficult to identify 
specific explanations.  It does, however, offer 
a number of suggestions. Core amongst these 
is the unavoidable idea that there may be an 
underestimation in global heroin consumption, 
especially, as suggested above, in emerging and 
currently hidden markets in Asia and Africa (p. 
30-34).  In reference to current control efforts, 
the Report also suggests that ‘increasing prices 
at source may not reflect higher demand but 
rather an increased risk in cultivation and 
trafficking resulting from the intensification of 
law enforcement activities’ or an expansion in 
the market for raw opium (i.e. that not processed 
into heroin), which could feed increased opium 
consumption and, perhaps, a parallel illicit 
market for opiates such as morphine’ (p. 30). 
Although we are not provided with any evidence 
for this contention, we are also informed that 
high prices at source could also be explained 
by speculation in the local market (p.1 & 30). 
Within the context of the picture painted, all 
these scenarios offer plausible explanations. 
9However, the analysis of data sets other than 
the ‘others’ obliquely referred to in the separate 
(and dense) methodology section of the 
publication may offer alternatives9  
The Report itself admits that it is still too early to 
know the exact impact of the 2010 opium crop 
failure in Afghanistan on major illicit markets 
for opiates.  There was a general decrease in 
seizures in 2010 in most countries supplied 
by Afghan opiates and a heroin shortage 
observed in some European countries in 2010-
11.  Consequently, it is noted that ‘While these 
changes may not reflect a uniform and rapid 
response…, it is reasonable to assume that 
they reflect a rapid reaction in the markets of 
the countries closer to Afghanistan or those 
supplied through direct routes leading from 
Afghanistan’ (p. 30).  As noted earlier, there is 
evidence that the shortages resulted in some 
substance displacement and ‘encouraged’ users 
in some countries to replace heroin with other 
substances such as desomorphine, acetylated 
opium (known as ‘kompot’) and synthetic 
opioids such as fentanyl and buprenorphine.   
UNODC notes that perceived heroin shortages 
in UK may have been down to law enforcement 
efforts in Turkey, but also suggests that since 
it appears that heroin in the country comes 
more directly from South West Asia, the decline 
in Afghan production caused by disease was 
the more likely cause.  The Report also notes 
that ‘Other measures or circumstances may 
have made the shortage more severe in 
some countries’ (p. 32).  The implicit, and not 
unreasonable, message running throughout the 
discussion of the illicit opiate market is that ‘we 
cannot explain the current but obviously shifting 
situation’.  While this is the case, UNODC admits 
that DTOs are clearly ‘adept’ at responding to 
market changes, especially law enforcement 
activities, and that this reality may mean that 
the impact of counter drug strategies may 
be short-lived and act to diversify rather than 
eliminate trafficking routes  (pp. 32-33).  In 
this respect, it is reported that large quantities 
of heroin continue to be trafficked along the 
main Balkan route (Afghanistan to Western and 
Central Europe via South-Eastern Europe).  Yet 
declining seizures were reported in most of the 
countries in these regions in 2010 (against a 
backdrop of slightly increased global seizures). 
However, reinforcing the idea that Africa and 
Asia are increasing areas of concern, the 
Report notes that ‘coastal markets of Africa are 
reporting increasing seizures, as are markets 
in South-East Asia..’.  Reflecting the on-going 
uncertainly characterising the current state of 
the opiate market, it continues,  ‘Whether this 
implies that traffickers are seeking alternative 
routes or that heroin use is on the increase in 
those places, the lack of available data makes it 
impossible to draw definitive conclusions.  But, 
one thing is clear: the opiate market continues 
to be extremely flexible and adaptable’ (p. 2).    
As with opiates, we are informed that ‘The 
general stability of global cocaine use …masks 
different trends in different regions and different 
countries’ (p.2).  Furthermore, despite a decline 
in production there has been no apparent fall 
in global cocaine consumption.  Available data 
on cultivation, yield and trafficking indicate 
that there has been an overall decline in the 
global manufacture of cocaine in the five-year 
period 2006-2010 (p.2 & p. 35).  That said, the 
Report attributes this to a decline in cocaine 
manufacture in Colombia between 2005 and 
2010, although there has been a sizable shift 
in the market as coca bush cultivation and coca 
production increased in the same period in 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru (p. 2 & 
p. 35).  In 2010, Bolivia was the site of 31,000 
hectares of coca bush cultivation, with Colombia 
(adjusted to include small fields) double that 
and Peru close behind at 61,000 hectares (p. 
35).  However, since the publication of the World 
Drug Report 2012, data from the 2011 national 
coca monitoring survey presented by UNODC 
and the Government of Bolivia revealed a drop in 
cultivation in that country to 27,200 hectares.10 
It will be interesting to see how this affects 
the cocaine market.  Indeed, it is significant 
that, despite such a fall, the White House 
determined Bolivia had ‘failed demonstrably 
10
during the previous 12 months to adhere to 
[its] obligations under international narcotics 
agreements’ and put forward the argument that 
Bolivia’s potential cocaine production, the result 
of complex extrapolations largely ignored in this 
year’s Report, had increased to exceed that of 
Colombia.11 Accompanied by opaque to non-
existent methodology, this is an obvious attempt 
to cast Bolivia as a threat to the international 
drug control system as La Paz continues in its 
quest to adjust its position on the traditional 
use of the coca leaf within the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs.12
While serious questions exist as to how US 
authorities calculated the potential cocaine 
production figures released in September 
2012, as is normally the case, the figures on 
coca production within the World Drug Report 
also raise issues concerning the differences 
between data sets and consequently issues 
of comparability and certainty.13  Conscious 
of the issue, the Report goes to some length 
to point out that ‘numerous efforts have been 
made by UNODC and the Bolivian, Colombian 
and Peruvian Governments to ensure the 
comparability of the estimates of their 
respective areas under coca bush monitoring’ 
(p. 40).  All the approaches are scientifically 
based and reliant on remote sensing.  However, 
differences in the size of monitored areas, the 
concepts used for the area under coca bush 
cultivation, climatic conditions, the availability 
of secondary information and security risks 
impeding access to growing areas have led 
the systems to use different implementation 
modalities, technologies and data sources (pp. 
40-1).  Data capture in Colombia is further 
complicated as high levels of eradication force 
coca growers into different harvesting patterns 
and to relocate geographically.     
The Report also shows that, while the US market 
continued to be supplied almost exclusively 
from cocaine produced in Colombia, from 2006 
there was a shift in the European markets, which 
compensated, at least partially, for the shortage 
of Colombian cocaine with that produced in 
Bolivia and Peru (p. 39).  On this point, UNODC 
admits that ‘more investigation is necessary’ 
(p. 39).  Moreover, and again reflecting the 
dynamism of DTOs, the Report notes that 
‘The decline in seizures in Europe, despite the 
apparent stability of the region’s cocaine supply, 
implies that a change in trafficking modes 
is occurring as traffickers may be making 
increasing use of containers’ (p.2).  In the 
USA, the decline in the availability of cocaine 
has been reflected in rising prices since 2007. 
However, in Europe no dramatic changes in 
prices have been observed since 2007.  Overall, 
‘they remained at the same level in dollar terms 
between 2007 and 2010 and even decreased in 
some countries’ (p. 2).   
Interestingly in terms of shifting market structures, 
another factor influencing the availability of, 
and demand for, cocaine in different regions 
is the emergence of ‘new, albeit small, cocaine 
markets in, for example, Eastern Europe and 
South-East Asia’.  Reflecting a continuing trend, 
UNODC notes that ‘There is also some evidence 
that cocaine trafficking through West Africa 
may have had a spill-over effect on countries 
in that sub-region, with cocaine emerging as a 
drug of major concern, along with heroin’ (p. 2). 
Furthermore, increases in Bolivia and Peru may 
be driven by demand for cocaine in different 
regions outside main markets of North America, 
Western and Central Europe and South America. 
Reinforcing the continuing uncertainty around 
emerging geographical areas of concern, the 
Report advises that ‘Since no recent studies 
on prevalence are available for these emerging 
markets, the upward trend in cocaine seizures 
in such markets could highlight an emerging 
problem that is not yet visible in demand data’ 
(p. 40). There is also limited information on 
other markets, including potentially significant 
states with growing urban centres, and hence 
potentially large numbers of cocaine users, like 
India and China.  
Shifting patterns and considerable uncertainly 
also characterise the Report’s description and 
analysis of the production and trafficking of ATS. 
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However, unlike cocaine, global ATS production 
is increasing.  The illicit manufacture of ATS 
(mainly methamphetamine, amphetamine and 
‘ecstasy’) ‘is difficult to measure because it is 
widespread and often on a small scale’ (p 2). 
Although, the use and global seizures of ATS 
remained largely stable, 2010 was marked by 
an increase in methamphetamine seizures to 
more than double the amount of 2008.  This 
was partly due to seizures increasing in Central 
America (principally Mexico) and East and 
South East Asia.  Reflecting prevalence, the 
Report states that, ‘For the first time since 2006, 
global methamphetamine seizures surpassed 
global amphetamine seizures, which fell by 42 
per cent (to 19.4 tons) mainly as a result of a 
decrease in seizures in the Near and Middle 
East and South-West Asia’ (p. 51).  Additionally, 
despite significant rises in the dismantling of 
clandestine amphetamine laboratories, seizures 
of the drug in Europe continued a downward 
trend, reaching their lowest levels since 2002 
(5.4 tons).  Seizures of ‘ecstasy’ in Europe, 
doubling from 595 kg in 2009 to 1.3 tons in 
2010, provide further evidence of a recovery of 
the market for the drug.  
The Report also presents evidence to suggest 
that criminal organisations are increasingly 
involved with the smuggling of ATS, especially 
methamphetamine, and exploit West Africa in a 
similar way to cocaine traffickers.  For example, 
seizures of methamphetamine from West Africa 
being smuggled into East Asian countries, 
mainly Japan and the Republic of Korea, 
started to increase in 2008.  Increasing annual 
legitimate requirements for precursor chemicals 
of ATS (ephedrine and pseudoephedrine) in the 
Near and Middle East also suggest that some 
diversion into illicit markets is occurring.  As 
with involvement in other drug markets, the 
Report highlights that DTOs continue to adapt 
manufacturing strategies in relation to ATS and 
present ‘a myriad of new challenges to drug 
control authorities worldwide’ (p. 51 & p.56). 
In terms of cannabis, production of the drug 
is stated to be a ‘truly global phenomenon’ (p. 
43).  Seizure and eradication data suggest that 
the production of cannabis herb in particular 
is ‘increasingly widespread’ (p. 2), but the 
often localised, small-scale nature of cannabis 
cultivation and production make it difficult 
to assess.  In fact, new data on large-scale 
global production of cannabis resin are only 
available for Afghanistan.  The Report makes 
it clear, however, that there are differences in 
importance of cannabis herb and cannabis 
resin between regions.  The more protracted 
mechanism of processing the cannabis plant 
into resin is confined to a relatively limited 
number of countries in North Africa, the Near 
and Middle East and South West Asia. In the 
rest of the world, including the USA where 
production continues to be high (especially 
indoor cultivation), herb forms of the drug 
are dominant.  As is the case for other drugs, 
figures for Africa are especially hard to come by, 
but seizure data suggest that cannabis herb is 
also dominant across the continent except for 
North Africa (p. 43).  The production of resin 
is ‘assumed’ to be small in Europe, the world’s 
biggest market for resin (with North Africa – 
and especially Morocco) long being Europe’s 
main supplier.  That said, the market may be 
restructuring as Afghanistan’s role in resin 
production (and maybe that of India) increases. 
Interestingly, despite the frequent focus on 
the illicit poppy crop, cannabis is actually 
Afghanistan’s most lucrative cash crop.14 
While this is the case, the proliferation of 
indoor cannabis sites and ‘differing trends 
in prices and seizures of cannabis herb and 
resin’ indicate that there may be a shift in the 
European cannabis market, with most European 
Union member states reporting the cultivation 
of herb to be a ‘phenomenon that appears to 
be on the increase’ (p. 47).  The Report claims 
that, while usually small scale, indoor cultivation 
may include major operations run by criminal 
groups choosing to supply local markets and 
reduce the risks of trafficking).  Recent law 
enforcement activities in the Netherlands (the 
main producer of the herb within Europe) have 
apparently displaced production to Central, 
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East and Northern Europe, while UNODC also 
concedes the increasingly widespread existence 
of businesses specialising in paraphernalia for 
growing cannabis (p. 48).  
While again avoiding the hysteria of earlier 
Reports,15 UNODC again addresses the issue 
of cannabis potency: proposing that the ‘...rise 
in indoor cultivation of cannabis is often related 
to an increase in cannabis potency, which is 
reflected in the data only to a limited extent’ (p. 3 
& 49, emphasis added).  In a similarly measured 
and welcome manner, we are informed that 
‘Such increases in potency may explain, in 
part at least, the increase in treatment demand 
among cannabis users, though this may also be 
related to the cumulative effects of prolonged 
use…’.  It should be noted here that increased 
treatment demand for cannabis may also be 
a result of criminal justice approaches that 
favour non-punitive diversion.  Interestingly, the 
Report also notes that the reported increase in 
domestic indoor cannabis cultivation cannot be 
easily linked to an increase in prevalence.  Data 
for Europe indicate use has increased in a small 
number of countries, (including Sweden), but 
stabilised or decreased in others.  The Report 
also states, ‘It is not clear whether there have 
been changes in the amount consumed or if 
imported cannabis is being replaced by locally 
produced cannabis.  Furthermore, other factors 
such as the decline in tobacco smoking among 
young people, changes in lifestyle and fashion 
or replacement by other drugs, may have 
influenced cannabis use’ (p. 49).
UNODC’s cultural narrative of drug use: 
The return of the ‘containment’ thesis
Chapter two of this year’s Report is entitled ‘The 
contemporary drug problem: Characteristics, 
patterns and driving factors’, and makes an 
attempt to situate the illicit use of drugs in 
a historical and cultural context.  IDPC has 
criticised previous Reports for concentrating 
solely on quantifying the ‘world drug problem’,16 
while disregarding the cultural meanings that 
drug use has both for its participants and for 
social and political authorities.17  Chapter two 
therefore represents a positive development, 
and makes for an interesting read.  However, 
UNODC’s overarching commitment to the 
present drug control regime led it to interpret the 
historical and cultural context of drug markets 
is in a way that tends to celebrate rather than 
attempt a balanced and realistic assessment of 
the existing regime.  UNODC’s established theme 
of containment (the restriction of illicit drug use 
to a relatively small section of the population – 
approximately 5 per cent) remains prominent in 
this year’s Report. By contrast, the unintended 
consequences of the drug control system, which 
were acknowledged and elaborated upon by a 
previous Executive Director,18 are mentioned 
but strongly downplayed. 
Outline of data presented in Chapter Two of 
the Report: ‘The Contemporary Drug Problem: 
Characteristics, Patterns and Driving Factors’
As indicated by its title, the chapter is organised 
into three main sections. Section A deals 
with the ‘fundamental characteristics of the 
contemporary drug problem’ (p.59) and covers 
the geographical spread of contemporary 
drug use, which as noted above is perceived 
to be stabilising in developed economies and 
expanding in developing ones; the growth and 
globalisation of the illicit drug market, and its 
impact upon society and state, measured in 
terms of health, productivity and so on.  Section 
B examines the ways in which the characteristics 
of ‘the drug problem’ have shifted over time, 
setting out to map the shifts in the major drug 
markets.  Section C attempts to explore the 
driving factors that shape the contemporary 
problem.  These sections continually overlap, and 
the following analysis traces this overlapping, 
rather than pursuing a strictly sequential outline. 
Finally, these three sections are supplemented 
by section D, ‘Conclusion’- which, however, 
rather than drawing conclusions as such, 
summarises the materials elaborated in the 
Chapter’s previous sections.
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While remarking that drugs have been 
‘consumed throughout history, in different 
forms’ (p.59), the authors state that the present 
configuration has emerged over the past half 
century, and is characterised by ‘a concentration 
of illicit drug use among youth, notably young 
males living in urban settings, and an expanding 
number of psychoactive substances...’ (p.59). 
The chapter ‘explains how it has been shaped by 
fundamental and enduring factors that define its 
nature, as well as by shorter-term development 
that have contributed to modifying its patterns 
over time’ (p.59).
In its discussion of the ‘main dimensions’ of 
the problem, section A states that, against a 
backdrop of a global population of some 7 billion 
people, about 230 million used a controlled 
drug illicitly at least once last year.  The figure 
represents approximately 1 in 20 people aged 
16-24.  In the same age range, some 1 in 40 
have used drugs in the past month, and 1 in 
160 ‘in a manner that exposes them to very 
severe health problems’ (p.59).  The authors 
locate the concentration of drug usage in the 
youth population, and in young men rather 
than young women. The chapter also seeks to 
show that when prevalence rates of licit and 
controlled drugs are compared, it is evident that 
‘the introduction of international controls has 
contributed to maintaining lower consumption 
rates for illicit drugs’ (p.61). 
Taking as its object the last 50 years, the 
chapter describes a set of usage trends for the 
mostly widely consumed drugs.  In the case of 
cannabis – by far the most widely used – the 
large US market saw rising consumption in the 
1960s and 1970s followed by ‘steep declines’ in 
the 1980s, and then another period of increase 
in the 1990s.  Since the year 2000, the overall 
trend has been stable.  The Report claims 
that, ‘past month prevalence of cannabis use 
among persons aged 12-34 as well as annual 
prevalence among persons aged 12 and over in 
the United States, is...some 50 per cent lower 
than the 1979 peak’ (p.73).  While patterns of 
cannabis use elsewhere in the world differed, 
the overall picture is one of stabilisation and 
decline following an earlier peak. The trends for 
other drugs tend to be similar, though recent 
displacements of geography and substance, 
which render the matter more differentiated 
and complex, are also reported. The point 
UNODC makes is that the general trend is one 
of stabilisation.
The Report’s use of data to support the 
UNODC containment thesis
How are these data sets situated in terms of 
the Report’s overall explanatory framework? 
Essentially, they are deployed in support of 
UNODC’s containment thesis – the argument 
that, while drug use has not been entirely 
erased to realise the utopia of a ‘drug free 
world’, it has nevertheless been restricted to 
a minority population, especially in terms of 
the more problematic forms of drug use.  It is 
a contentious argument, particularly given the 
difficulty of examining the world without the 
present drug control regime in order to isolate 
and compare its effects.  Yet the Report finds 
further support for its ‘containment’ claim 
by informing the reader that tobacco and 
alcohol use, the two major licit intoxicants, are 
much more widely used than their controlled 
counterparts, at respectively 10 times and 8 
times the prevalence rate.  It claims that this 
constitutes evidence of the restrictive effect of 
existing efforts at drug control.  
However, when more closely analysed, these 
figures can easily be interpreted to mean 
something very different, particularly when 
their use is situated in cultural terms rather than 
just viewed in the abstract.  For instance, if we 
take Europe as an example, the use of alcohol 
in the form of wines and beers goes back many 
centuries and is thoroughly embedded in social 
and cultural life.  The cultural historian Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch notes that, ‘Prior to the introduction 
of the potato, beer was second only to bread as 
the main source of nourishment for most central 
and north Europeans’.19  Beer was understood as 
a food at this time in European history, and most 
working people would consume a beer soup for 
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breakfast.  Additionally, alcohol was used in bouts 
of extreme intoxication, and was drunk in great 
quantities on a host of ceremonial occasions. 
The movement toward more moderate modes 
of alcohol use involved not only ideological 
changes regarding the value of abstinence (such 
as those stemming from Puritanism and early 
capitalism), but also the advent of new drinks 
containing new psychoactive substances that 
could replace alcohol as devices that punctuated 
the working day: tea, coffee and chocolate being 
foremost among them.  The drinking patterns 
evident in contemporary Europe emerged from 
the slow sifting of substances through social life 
into a set of embedded social and cultural norms. 
It is primarily these that regulate their use, rather 
than laws devised for the purpose.20  Attempts to 
prohibit the non-medical or recreational uses of 
alcohol in European and post-European societies 
such as the USA have not been successful. 
Indeed, a plausible argument can be made that 
alcohol is legal in ‘Western’ societies because 
it is so culturally embedded that attempts to 
regulate it along the lines of the drug control 
conventions- permitting ‘scientific and medical’ 
uses only would be massively resisted – and 
ultimately circumvented – as they were in the 
USA in the 1920s.21  Illicit drugs such as heroin 
and cocaine, on the contrary, were relatively 
new to the early twentieth century legislators 
who instituted the drug control regime. Contrary 
to the UNODC claim, this implies that alcohol is 
not more prevalent because it is legal, but legal 
because it is more prevalent. 
A problematic interpretation of the historical 
and cultural context of drug markets
In addition to outlining what it believes to be 
the shape of the contemporary drug problem, 
the Report maps the contours of the state’s 
role in regulating it.  In this context, the text 
reiterates a second, now familiar, argument 
that drug problems across the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century world (opium addiction 
in China, hashish-linked insanity in Egypt) led 
to the construction of the international drug 
control regime whose primary focus has been 
on public health.  IDPC has elsewhere critiqued 
this argument on historical grounds; in addition 
to public health imperatives, those of political 
and economic power were highly important 
factors, along with discourses of the racial 
superiority of the West.22
In a further elaboration of its analysis which takes 
us squarely onto the territory of cultural politics, 
the chapter goes on to trace ‘the unfolding of 
today’s drug problem in changing societies’ 
(p.63).  It argues that the ‘expansion of today’s 
illicit drug problem started with youth in North 
America in the 1960s, spread to Western Europe 
and, eventually, to the rest of the world’(p.63). 
The drug use of the 1960s was, the authors 
suggest, an element in youth culture and the 
counter-cultural movement which sought to 
reform Western societies.  According to the 
authors: ‘After the end of the war in Viet Nam 
and the social reforms of the 1970s in many 
countries, this broad youth protest movement 
largely faded away and with it the “ideological” 
basis for illicit drug use’ (p.63).23  The notion 
that the changes of the 1960s resulted from a 
‘youth protest movement’ that faded away at 
the end of the 1960s is somewhat simplistic. 
The ideas, attitudes and social changes that 
marked the decade were not without historical 
precedent, and did not disappear; indeed, many 
of them were embraced by a libertarian popular 
culture in which drug use continues to be 
celebrated. While UNODC notes the continuing 
linkages of drugs with various forms of youth 
culture, this section represents the agency’s 
closest engagement of its drugs narrative with 
a historiographic narrative of twentieth century 
cultural change.  
Despite noting that cannabis was linked to ‘the 
jazz era of the 1920s’ (p.63), the chapter tends 
toward a rather limited notion of the historical 
embedding of drug use in modern social and 
cultural life.  It is correct to note that the cannabis 
use of the 1960s reached far larger sections 
of the population than its 1920s forerunner, 
but, with its focus overwhelmingly on drug 
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as an issue of governance, UNODC fails to 
demonstrate an awareness of the long historical 
relationship between drugs and modernity, and 
the integral part these substances have played 
in the development of the modern world.  David 
Courtwright has termed the impact of drugs 
on modern life ‘the psychoactive revolution’,24 
and this is no exaggeration.  This radical set of 
changes had its roots in the intercontinental 
explorations of the renaissance, the commerce 
of the spice trade and search for new routes to 
transport these luxurious items to the West.  The 
beginnings of globalisation lay here, and a key 
part of the process was the confluence of the 
world’s drugs – an on-going movement toward 
increasing psychoactive availability, variety 
and potency that was accelerated by the new 
science of pharmacology, which teased out 
ever more powerful alkaloids from the original 
menu of plant drugs.  In the nineteenth century, 
these drugs became commodities distributed 
on international markets, and were used not 
only as medicines but as substances around 
which new cultures grew up. The romantics, 
the pre-Raphaelites, the French decadents 
were amongst the many literary and artistic 
subcultures that employed drugs to change 
consciousness and as elements in a counter-
cultural identity.  
The point in raising this historical context is 
not simply to prove that UNODC is mistaken in 
dating the birth of youth-oriented drug cultures 
to the 1960s, but to stress that drugs have been 
an essential part of social life and culture for 
hundreds of years, and that they have played 
many roles beyond the purely problematic one 
that UNODC continuously seeks to highlight.25 
Moreover, their use has risen and fallen in cycles 
throughout the modern period, a stubborn 
historical fact that poses serious problems for 
projects aiming ultimately to restrict their uses 
solely to ‘medical and scientific’ purposes.26 
This integral relationship between drugs 
and modern ways of life represents a type of 
challenge to which the UN drug control regime 
shows little sign of rising to meet.
The Report’s finding that drug use has been 
successfully contained amongst adults
The Report also proposes a hypothesis to 
account for its observed containment of drug 
use amongst the young.  This ‘may actually be 
less the result of a higher propensity among 
young people to take drugs than the effect of a 
lower propensity of adults to transgress laws and 
social norms’ (p.64).  Deployed in support of this 
hypothesis are data showing that the prevalence 
rates for illicit substance use drop much more 
rapidly than that for use of licit substances as 
people age.  The existence of the drug control 
system, with its prohibitive stance in relation 
to the non-medical use of drugs, is celebrated 
once again as the limiter of harms: its system of 
laws and norms is credited with restricting drug 
use to a youth population that is more reckless 
in its attitude toward the transgression of laws 
and norms.  Thus, the text suggests that ‘the 
drug control system acts as a powerful brake 
against the extension of illicit drug use from 
adolescence to maturity’ (p.64).  This thesis is 
difficult to either prove or disprove.  Although 
the data indicate that drugs are primarily used 
by youth, the data may be a statistical artifice, 
and misleading: the police tend to focus their 
interdiction efforts on young people, especially 
those who dress and speak in ‘counter-cultural’ 
ways, or who belong to ethnic minorities.27 
Drug use data are socially constructed, and 
their provisional and tentative nature should be 
kept continually in mind.  Moreover, youth may 
show a greater frankness about their drug use, 
whereas adults, with more to lose economically 
and socially, may tend to be more discreet.  It is 
likely that at least some degree of distortion is 
present in the data as a result of such factors.28
Yet even if these data were accurate, there are 
numerous other alternative cultural and social 
interpretations.  Drugs are often associated 
with youth culture, and many people simply 
stop using them when they become engaged in 
building careers, families and so on.  Such a step 
may be taken not from fear of police repression, 
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but as a result of a change in attitude.  The 
essential point here is that UNODC is rather 
too enthusiastic in assigning phenomena to the 
effectiveness of the drug control system, when 
there are often competing explanations carrying 
just as much force.
UNODC’s analysis of factors driving drug use
Section C is where the discussion concentrates 
on various factors (other than those mentioned 
above) that are said to be shaping the evolution 
of the contemporary drug landscape.  The 
themes presented in this section include:
• Socio-demographic drivers – essentially 
this reiterates the point that the typical 
drug user is a young male living in a city’; 
in fact, these passages describe drug 
prevalence in demographic terms, and do 
not attempt to identify causes or ‘drivers’.
• Socio-cultural drivers – this refers to the 
type of cultural factors that UNODC has 
in the past preferred to evade, though it 
is far from alone in doing so.  As the text 
remarks, ‘some of these phenomena are 
difficult to measure and quantify’ (p.87). 
Commendably, the Report nevertheless 
does try to get to grips with the issue, 
and begins by stating that, ‘The most 
significant sociocultural driving factor for 
the evolution of the drug problem appears 
to have been the popularization of a 
youth culture’ (p.87).  The text continues: 
‘In many developing countries, this has 
taken place alongside an orientation 
toward a Western way of life, which may, 
for some, include the temptation to use 
illicit drugs’ (p.87).  It also notes that these 
processes of social and cultural change 
are characterised by ‘a trend toward 
decreasing social control’, with migration 
and urbanisation tending to attenuate 
traditional values and ‘strong family ties’ 
(p.87).  The listed sociocultural drivers 
also refer to the topic of religion, which 
is often ‘anti-drug’ in its ethics and which, 
according to UNODC, may constitute a 
form of ‘protection’ for individuals against 
the corrosive effects of drugs.  The last 
factor to be mentioned here is the effect on 
children and adolescents of environmental 
circumstances such as violence, neglect, 
abuse, instability, household dysfunction 
and so on, although the categorisation of 
such issues as ‘sociocultural’ in the sense 
that youth cultures are ‘sociocultural’, is a 
problematic item of typology.
• Socio-economic drivers – these 
passages focus on the linkage of drug 
use with the availability of disposable 
income, though it adds the caveat that this 
factor in isolation has little explanatory 
power.  For example, Swedish citizens 
have high levels of disposable income 
yet drug use is relatively low, while the 
opposite conditions obtain in Afghanistan. 
Social inequality, disadvantage and 
unemployment are also strongly linked 
with drug use.29  The drug control system 
itself is then discussed as a means of drug 
prevention, and a list of several national 
examples used in support of the argument 
that ‘drug control interventions’ have 
suppressed drug production, trafficking 
and use.  However, the choice of cases 
used is very selective, presenting evidence 
that supports UNODC’s arguments while 
ignoring the numerous cases that do not 
(and even amongst the cases chosen, the 
argument is often weak).  For example, 
little awareness is shown of the problem 
of substance displacement, where users 
denied access to a given drug will change 
to an alternative rather than become 
abstinent. The text acknowledges the 
reality of such a ‘balloon effect’, but 
appears unaware of a key long term 
characteristic of the illicit market, namely, 
that as mechanisms of suppression are 
brought to bear upon these substances, 
they return in more concentrated, radical 
and potentially hazardous forms. It 
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appears that only when opium smoking 
was legally suppressed in South East Asia, 
for example, the (much more dangerous) 
injecting of heroin occupied its place.30 
 The Report also showcases instances such 
as the Chinese communist suppression 
of opium use during the 1950s are 
mentioned as successes, while they were 
achieved only at the cost of levels of social 
repression that would be considered 
wholly unacceptable by the majority of 
people in liberal democracies.31
A number of ‘formal theories’ are then briefly 
discussed, such as those which analyse drug 
use according to a disease model of epidemics. 
‘Unforeseeable factors’ which change the shape 
of drug markets are reviewed in summary, and 
included in this category are the ‘unintended 
consequences’ of drug control mentioned 
above.  ‘The development of black markets 
and opportunities they create for organised 
crime’, note the authors, ‘have been among 
the unintended side effects’ (p.93).  This is an 
extraordinary statement, which downplays the 
fundamental role that the drug control regime 
has in creating the illicit market, and placing this 
group of commodities outside the regulatory 
systems that govern and oversee the production, 
commercial transactions and consumption of 
other commodities in contemporary societies. 
The regime has, by virtue of its very existence, 
composed a space in which governance and 
oversight do not function, and in which demand 
is instead met by illicit organisations having no 
state restrictions placed upon the profit motive.32 
Predictions for the future of ‘the drug problem’
Before reaching its concluding paragraphs, 
the chapter seeks to address the possible 
developments for ‘the drug problem’ in the 
near future.  To do so, it draws on the patterns 
elaborated in the previous sections, and arrives 
at three sets of potentials, which it terms the 
likely, the possible, and the unknown.  The first 
of these is based on demographic projections 
of a global population currently at 7 billion, 
estimated to be 9.3 billion by 2050 and 10.1 
billion by 2100.  It predicts that drug use will 
remain concentrated amongst youth, while the 
‘gender gap’ (more men than women using 
drugs) looks likely to reduce as developing 
countries modernise and gender inequalities 
diminish.  Increasing urbanisation will combine 
with these factors to lead to expanding use in 
developing nations, especially in Africa.  On the 
other hand, the growth of an ageing population 
in the developed world will counteract this 
trend, with overall levels of prevalence likely 
to remain stable.  The rising numbers of 
consumers located in developing nations, which 
will represent an increased proportion of the 
market, means that profits for organised crime 
drug trafficking groups will likely decrease.  In 
such circumstances, the Report expects that the 
trade will make up some 0.5 per cent of global 
GDP, or even less. By way of comparison, the 
current figure is approximately 1.5 per cent of 
global GDP.33
Under the heading of ‘the possible’, the proposed 
scenario is one in which heroin and cocaine 
markets decline. Efforts by governments ‘should 
eventually’ lead to sustainable crop eradication 
(p.95).  In a statement that echoes the high 
expectations of the early, heroic years of the 
drug control regime, the text claims that, ‘History 
has also shown Governments that a closely 
coordinated approach at the international level 
is required to prevent the balloon effect’.  Since 
the balloon effect is as much a part of the global 
drug scene as it has ever been, and has never 
been prevented in the long or even medium term, 
these claims are dubious.  We might compare the 
UNODC’s optimism with the sober assessment 
of the highly respected commentators Paoli, 
Greenfield and Reuter, writing in 2009 of the 
future prospects for cutting illicit opiate supplies: 
‘In sum, our analysis does not augur well for the 
international drug control regime. We find little 
reason to predict success in reducing the world 
supply of opiates and only limited opportunities 
to affect national or regional conditions.’34  The 
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caution shown by these authors is informed 
by a historical background in which the illicit 
trade has repeatedly adjusted to the strategies 
of law enforcement, and managed to maintain 
the flow of its products to a global consumer 
base. Despite being beyond the law, it remains 
a dynamic mode of consumer capitalism 
that has consistently remained ahead of the 
control regime, and shows little prospect of 
changing in this regard. More realistically, the 
Report observes that there are no signs of 
the cannabis market reducing in dimensions, 
and acknowledges that use of ATS and other 
synthetic drugs looks set to grow. 
In the third set of potentials, discussed under the 
moniker of ‘the unknown’, UNODC recognises 
that, ‘History has shown...that unforeseen 
events can play a bigger role in shaping the drug 
problem than many of the other factors’ (p.96). 
The most refreshing aspect of this section is 
its candid stance toward the play of events, 
although it uses up most of this space warning 
of dire consequences ‘in the unlikely event of 
a fundamentally changed drug control system’ 
(p.96).  Here, the argument is that the reduced 
prices that would follow from a legalised market 
may well lead to increases in consumption, 
particularly for heroin and cocaine.  
Overall, however, the predictive value of many of 
these points is very limited.  The data upon which 
they rely is almost certainly inadequate, even as 
a basis for making large generalisations about 
the present, let alone the future.  Rather than 
depending on a solid foundation of data as they 
claim, they are instead built upon assumptions 
about a future which largely disregards the 
influence of cultural movements and shifts of 
perception – those ‘unpredictable fashion-type 
evolutions’ (p.93) that are so difficult to quantify 
and yet so central to the symbolic meanings 
that drugs transmit to their users and, usually in 
different ways, to those concerned in ordering 
and governing social and cultural life. 
Conclusions
As usual, there is much that is valuable in the 
World Drug Report 2012.  While there remain 
major issues with data capture, methodology 
and consequent interpretation, the Report 
provides broad ranges for its estimates. In 
addition, its detailed collation and trend analysis 
is supplemented by a thematic chapter which, 
among other things, initiates a discussion of 
cultural and historical themes that UNODC sees 
as informing and underlying the contemporary 
‘world drug problem’.  
IDPC argues, however, that chapter two is 
too concerned to defend the achievements of 
the drug control regime to really take up the 
opportunity offered by its discussion. Such a 
vociferous defence, as echoed in the UNODC 
Executive Director’s Preface, leave us in no 
doubt that UNODC perceives the drug control 
system as being under threat of unravelling. 
(Ironically, an enhanced degree of flexibility on 
behalf of the system may be the best way to 
retain it – a situation of ‘bend or break’.35) Yet the 
defence of the conventions and the system that 
they underpin is inscribed in the interpretation 
of the data in the main body of the Report.  
The presence of the containment narrative, which 
defends the alleged achievements of the drug 
control system, is prominent.  Nonetheless, it is 
highly likely that there are hidden populations of 
drug consumers, as UNODC itself acknowledges, 
and that these, in combination with the failure of 
several member states with large populations 
to return Annual Report Questionnaires, 
render the ‘real’ size of the illicit drug using 
population an unknown quantity, and a matter 
for conjecture.  Moreover, the market situation 
is perpetually mobile; as the authors observe, 
‘…while the troubled waters of the world’s illicit 
drug markets may appear to be stagnant, shifts 
and currents in their flows and currents can be 
observed beneath the surface’ (p.1).  Under 
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such circumstances, the containment thesis 
inevitably looks fragile.  UNODC may be unwise, 
therefore, to pin its strategy on such shifting 
sands.  An alternative would be for it to continue 
down a path on which it has already taken a few 
tentative steps, and to act as a ‘critical friend’ 
to the broader system.  In this vein, and aware 
of the methodological challenges that it would 
generate, the centenary of the international 
control framework is perhaps also an appropriate 
time to devote more attention to measuring the 
costs and ‘unintended consequences’ of the 
system that, much like the real state of shifting 
markets, currently lie hidden and below the data 
presented in the Report.36 
Acknowledgments
Thanks go to the IDPC Secretariat, IDPC 
members, and to others who in various ways 
contributed to the content of this report. 
Particular thanks go to Ajay Kumar Solanki, 
Ajeng Larasati, Kosum Omphornuwat, Maheswar 
Satpathy, Sankar Arumuham and Umananda 
Chakpram for highlighting the problems within 
UNODC’s extrapolation methodology.  The 
usual caveat applies with any errors of fact or 
misinterpretation being the responsibility of the 
lead authors. 
The International Drug Policy Consortium is a global network of non-government 
organisations and professional networks that specialise in issues related to illegal drug 
production and use. The Consortium aims to promote objective and open debate on 
the effectiveness, direction and content of drug policies at national and international 
level, and supports evidence-based policies that are effective in reducing drug-related 
harm. It produces occasional briefing papers, disseminates the reports of its member 
organisations about particular drug-related matters, and offers expert consultancy 
services to policy makers and officials around the world.
20
Endnotes
1 Comments of the President of the General Assembly, 
Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser.  The General Assembly 
launch can be viewed at: Thematic Debate on ‘Drugs 
and Crime as a Threat to Development’ - General As-
sembly: http://webtv.un.org/search/part-i-thematic-
debate-on-drugs-and-crime-as-a-threat-to-develop-
ment-general-assembly/1708151144001?term=Wor
ld_Drug_Report  
2 Opening Speech at the Plenary, 55th Session of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs 2012, http://www.un-
odc.org/unodc/en/speeches/speech55sessioncom-
mission-on-narcotic-drugs.html
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012), World 
Drug Report 2012, Methodology, p. 6, http://www.uno-
dc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2012.html 
4 ARQs that were more than 50 per cent completed were 
classified as having been ‘substantially filled in’; less 
than 50 per cent completion is classified as having been 
‘partially’ filled in.  See: United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (2012), World Drug Report 2012, Methodol-
ogy, p. 1, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/WDR-2012.html
5 Opiates are derived from papaver somniferum, the 
opium poppy; they include opium, morphine, codeine 
and heroin. The term ‘opioids’ applies to any substances 
which binds to the opioid receptors in the nervous sys-
tem, but is usually restricted to synthetic substances 
having opiate-like properties: they include methadone, 
fentanyl, tramadol etc.
6 International Drug Policy Consortium (2011), IDPC Re-
sponse to the UNODC World Drug Report, p. 16, http://
idpc.net/publications/2011/09/idpc-response-to-un-
odc-2011-world-drug-report
7 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012), 2012 
World Drug Report, Methodology p. 1. http://www.
unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2012/
Methodology.pdf 
8 International Drug Policy Consortium (2011), IDPC Re-
sponse to the UNODC World Drug Report, p. 8, http://
idpc.net/publications/2011/09/idpc-response-to-un-
odc-2011-world-drug-report 
9 These include data sets produced by Afghan organisa-
tions conducting fieldwork within the country.  
10 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Press Re-
lease, ‘Coca crop cultivation “falls significantly” in Bolivia 
according to 2011 coca monitoring survey’ http://www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/September/co-
ca-crop-cultivation-falls-significantly-in-bolivia-accor-
ding-to-2011-coca-monitoring-survey.html?ref=fs3 
See report in Spanish at: http://www.unodc.org/docu-
ments/crop-monitoring/Bolivia/Bolivia_coca_sur-
vey_spanish_2012_web.pdf 
11 Ledebur, K. & Youngers, C.A. (21 September 2012), US 
slams Bolivian drug control efforts lauded by UN, http://
www.wola.org/commentary/washington_in_wonder-
land 
12 For a discussion on the US position, see: Ledebur, K. & 
Youngers, C.A. (21 September 2012), US slams Boliv-
ian drug control efforts lauded by UN, http://www.wola.
org/commentary/washington_in_wonderland
13 See, for example: Washington Office on Latin America 
(31 July 2012), UN and US estimates for cocaine pro-
duction contradict each other, http://www.wola.org/
commentary/un_and_us_estimates_for_cocaine_
production_contradict_each_other 
14 The average gross income for a cannabis growing 
household was about $9,000 in 2010, compared to 
$4,900 for poppy.  United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (2012), World Drug Report 2012, p. 45, http://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-
2012.html 
15 See, for example United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (2006), World Drug Report 2006, Volume 1: 
Analysis, pp. 172-186, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2006.html 
16 Hallam, C. & Bewley-Taylor, D. (2010) ‘Mapping the 
world drug problem: Science and Politics in the United 
Nations drug control system’, The International Journal 
of Drug Policy, 21(1): 1-3
17 Hallam, C. & Bewley-Taylor, D. (2010), Drug use: Knowl-
edge, culture & context (Beckley Foundation), http://
www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BeckleyBriefing21.pdf
18 Costa, A.M. (2008) ‘Making drug control ‘fit for purpose’: 
Building on the UNGASS decade’ (Vienna: United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime), http://www.unodc.
org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/CND-
UNGASS-CRPs/ECN72008CRP17.pdf
19 Schivelbusch, W. (1993,) Tastes of paradise: A social 
history of spices, stimulants and intoxicants (New York: 
Vintage)
20 Bancroft, A. (2009), Drugs, intoxication & society (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press)
21 Levine, H.G. (1985), ‘The birth of American alcohol 
control: Prohibition, the power elite and the problem of 
Lawlessness’, Contemporary Drug Problems, Spring: 
63-115, http://dragon.soc.qc.cuny.edu/Staff/levine/
The-Birth-of-American-Alcohol-Control.pdf 
22 International Drug Policy Consortium (2008), The 
World Drug Report 2008: A response from the Inter-
national Drug Policy Consortium http://idpc.net/pub-
lications/2008/09/idpc-response-to-unodcs-world-
21
International Drug Policy Consortium
Fifth floor, 124–128 City Road, London
EC1V 2NJ, United Kingdom
telephone: +44 (0)20 7324 2975
email: contact@idpc.net
website: www.idpc.net
Copyright (C) 2012 International Drug Policy Consortium All rights reserved
Supported, in part, by a grant from the 
Open Society Foundations
drug-report
23 For historical analyses of the 1960s, see Marwick, A. 
(1998), The sixties: Cultural transformation in Britain, 
France, Italy and the United States, 1958-74 (Oxford 
University Press); Donnelly, M. (2005), Sixties Britain: 
Culture, society and politics (Harlow: Longman)
24 Courtwright, D.T. (2001), Forces of habit: Drugs and the 
making of the modern world (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press)
25 Klein, A. (2008), Drugs and the world (London: Reaktion 
Books)
26 Schneider, E. (2008),  Smack: Heroin and the American 
city (University of Pennsylvania Press)
27 Stevens, A. (2011), Drugs, crime and public health: The 
political economy of drug policy  (Abingdon: Routledge) 
28 Kalunta-Crumpton, A. (1999), Race and drug trials: The 
social construction of guilt and innocence (London: 
Ashgate); Muncie, J. (2009), Youth and crime: Third edi-
tion (London: Sage), especially Chapter 1
29 International Drug Policy Consortium (2012) Drug 
Policy Guide, 2nd Edition, http://idpc.net/publica-
tions/2012/03/idpc-drug-policy-guide-2nd-edition 
30 Westermeyer, J. (1976), ‘The pro-heroin effects of 
anti-opium laws in Asia’, Archives of General Psychia-
try, 3: 1135-1139  http://adlrf.org.au/wp-content/up-
loads/2012/02/Westermeyer-1976-The-Pro-Heroin-
Effects-of-Anti-Opium-Laws-in-Asia.pdf
31 Dikotter, F., Laamann, L. & Xun, Z. (2004), Narcotic cul-
ture: A history of drugs in China (London: Hurst and Co.)
32 Transform Drug Policy Foundation (2009), After the war 
on drugs: Blueprint for regulation, http://www.tdpf.org.
uk/blueprint%20download.htm 
33 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011), Es-
timating illicit financial flows resulting from drug traffick-
ing and other transnational organized crimes, http://
www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Stud-
ies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf 
34  Paoli, L., Greenfield, V.A. & Reuter, P. (2009), The world 
heroin market: Can supply be cut? (Oxford University 
Press)
35 Bewley-Taylor, D, (2012), International drug control: 
Consensus fractured (Cambridge University Press), pp. 
279-336
36 For more, see: Transform Drug Policy Foundation 
(2012), The Alternative world drug report: Counting the 
costs of the war on drugs, http://evolvecms.webfree-
lancersuk.co.uk/sites/default/files/AWDR.pdf; Bang-
kok Post (18 September 2012), Are our drug policies 
really working?, http://idpc.net/alerts/2012/09/are-
our-drug-policies-really-working 
